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We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as 
recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than non-students of their age. They give more 
to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime 
give more than those convicted for property crime. 
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At the Mercy of a Prisoner 
Three Dictator Experiments 
 
1. Research Question 
 
Individuals (do not) commit crime because they are more selfish than others (Birkeland, Cappelen et 
al. 2014). Those who have committed crime feel the urge to do good to others, to restore their self 
image (Gummerum and Hanoch 2012). To reject the first, and to support the second claim, the same 
experimental design has been used: a dictator game with prisoners. In the first study, prisoners do 
not give significantly less. In the second study, prisoners even give more.  
 
Strictly speaking, neither claim follows from the data. Ideally for testing the first claim one would 
have to randomly induce selfishness in some but not in other, otherwise identical individuals. One 
would then observe whether they commit crime, e.g. by checking the crime register. Ideally for 
testing the second claim, one would randomly induce otherwise identical individuals to commit 
crime. One would deprive them of any other opportunity to restore the moral balance. One would 
then observe whether those who committed crime give more to an outsider.  
 
Now both ideal designs are out of the question. If selfishness is a personality trait, it cannot be 
randomly assigned. And no ethics board would approve a design that turns innocent individuals into 
criminals. One must live with indirect and imperfect ways of substantiating the claims. If prisoners 
give less in the dictator game, this is consistent with the claim that more selfish individuals self-select 
into a criminal career. If prisoners give more in the dictator game, this is consistent with the self 
esteem explanation.  
 
Now this indirect evidence consists of population comparisons. One cannot rule out that a difference 
has been caused by specific features of the sample. Gummerum and Hanoch (2012) test adult male 
UK prisoners from a low security prison with mean age 38.24 years, and a mean sentence of 261 
months. Birkeland, Cappelen et al. (2014) test adult male Swedish prisoners from a medium security 
prison. 76.4% of them are above 25 years old.1 We add robustness by going to a different country 
(Germany), and testing (male) juvenile offenders with a much shorter sentence length (27.83 months 
in the first experiment, 33.10 months in the second experiment). As controls we use data from a 
meta study one of us has written (Engel 2011). We have microdata about crimes. We exclude ingroup 
solidarity as a motive by also testing donations to a charity. 
 
 
2. Design 
 
In 2009, 58 male inmates of the Adelsheim prison participated. Mean age was 19.64 years. 
Participants on average had already served 9.26 months. 34 were convicted for violent crime, 44 for 
property crime.2 Prisoners on average dispose of 180 € per month. 
 
Two participants are randomly and anonymously matched. Each participant decides in the active 
role. Afterwards, one player is randomly chosen as dictator (cf. Selten 1967). He decides which 
multiple of 50 Cents from an endowment of 5 € (7.34 $) to send to the other player, who has no 
endowment. We use zTree (Fischbacher 2007) and a “double blind” (Hoffman, McCabe et al. 1994) 
protocol. We assign each participant an identification number. The prison administration matches 
                                                          
1 Sentence length is unreported. 
2 The two numbers do not add up to 58 since some inmates fall into both categories, mostly because they 
committed robbery. 
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identification numbers with demographic information, while we never learn names. Participants are 
aware of this safeguard. 
 
In 2012, 62 male inmates of the same prison participated in the second experiment. Mean age was 
19.81 years. Participants on average had already served 9.47 months. 37 were convicted for violent 
crime, 24 for property crime. No participant of the second experiment participated in the first 
experiment. Each prisoner participated in an exact replication of the first experiment, and in a 
second dictator game. In the latter game, all prisoners held the active role. They decided which 
fraction of 5 € to send to Brot für die Welt, a well-renowned charity.  
 
On both occasions, the dictator game(s) were part of a battery of tests (with no relevance to the 
present paper), so that the prison administration could not infer choices in the dictator game from 
overall payoff. 
 
3. Results 
a) Prisoner to Prisoner vs. Control to Control 
 
We twice replicate the surprising earlier finding. In 2009, 38 of 58 participants give a positive 
amount, 12 even more than half of the pie. In 2012, 38 of our 62 participants give a positive amount 
to the other, anonymous inmate of the same prison. 16 give half of the endowment or more. 
Descriptively, this is very similar to 18,229 students. 62.64% of them give a positive amount. 28.33% 
give 50% or more of their endowment. However, 1491 non-students of similar age behave 
differently. Only 8.52% keep the endowment. 54.46% give 50% or more (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Descriptives 
The prisoner sample of 2009 gives significantly more than students. This supports Gummerum and 
Hanoch (2012). The effect is also present if we pool the data from both experiments. But in the 
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sample of 2012, the effect is only weakly significant. Yet the effect reverses if we compare prisoners 
with non-students (Table 1).  
 
 
 comparison with students comparison with non-students  
of comparable age 
controls vs prisoners 2009 OLS Tobit0 Logit0 OLS Tobit0 Logit0 
prisoner .048*** 
(.010) 
.070*** 
(.015) 
-.225** 
(.077) 
-.203** 
(.068) 
-.262** 
(.075) 
1.732*** 
(.485) 
cons .245*** 
(.010) 
.131*** 
(.016) 
-.417*** 
(.077) 
.496*** 
(.068) 
.483*** 
(.071) 
-2.374*** 
(.485) 
N 18287 18287 18287 1549 1549 1549 
       
controls vs prisoners 2012       
prisoner .019+ 
(.010) 
.025+ 
(.015) 
-.042 
(.077) 
-.232** 
(.068) 
-.304*** 
(.076) 
1.914*** 
(.485) 
cons .245*** 
(.010) 
.131*** 
(.016) 
-.417*** 
(.077) 
.497*** 
(.068) 
.483*** 
(.071) 
-2.374*** 
(.485) 
N 18291 18291 18291 1553 1553 1553 
       
controls vs prisoners  
2009 and 2012 
      
prisoner .033* 
(.015) 
.047* 
(.021) 
-.129 
(.100) 
-.218** 
(.069) 
-.284*** 
(.077) 
1.827*** 
(.489) 
cons .245*** 
(.010) 
.131*** 
(.016) 
-.417*** 
(.077) 
.497*** 
(.068) 
.483*** 
(.071) 
-2.374*** 
(.485) 
N 18349 18349 18349 1611 1611 1611 
 
Table 1 
Comparison with General Public: Statistical Tests 
all models cluster standard errors for studies 
Logit0: dv is a dummy that is 1 if the participant has given nothing 
OLS: dv is fraction of pie, normalized on the interval [0,1] 
Tobit0: dv as in OLS, lower level 0 
standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p < .001, + p < .1 
 
We conclude 
 
Result 1: In the dictator game, prisoners give more than students, but less than members of 
the general public of comparable age. 
 
 
b) Prisoners Giving to Charity 
 
Birkeland, Cappelen et al. (2014) find that the amount prisoners give to a randomly assigned member 
of the general public is statistically not distinguishable from the amount they give to another 
anonymous prisoner from the same institution. Students do even give more if the recipient is a 
charity (Eckel and Grossman 1996, Small and Loewenstein 2003, Branas-Garza 2006, Fong 2007). 
Figure 2 and Table 2 show that we find the same for prisoners. This excludes that the first result is 
driven by in-group favoritism. 
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Figure 2 
Giving to Another Prisoners vs. to a Charity 
bubble size stands for frequency  
bubbles above the line: participant gives more to charity than to another prisoner 
 
charity .110* 
cons .265*** 
N 124 
p model .0308 
 
Table 2 
Giving to Another Prisoners vs. to a Charity: Statistical Test 
linear fixed effects regression 
 
 
We conclude 
 
Result 2: In a dictator game, prisoners give more to charity than to an anonymous inmate of 
the same prison. 
 
 
c) Property Crime vs. Violent Crime 
 
Our project was approved by the ethics committee of Bonn University. Prisoners were free not to 
participate. They could give us permission to ask the prison administration for the crime for which 
they had been convicted. All participants did. The sample is too small to correlate dictator game 
giving with individual crimes. But we can separately code all crimes that impinge on foreign property, 
and all crimes that involve the exercise of physical violence.3 If those convicted for violent crime give 
more, this is another hint at the self esteem explanation, and a hint that selfishness might at least 
matter for those crimes directly related to goods with monetary value.  
 
The data from the 2009 sample seem to suggest that, indeed, those convicted for violent crime give  
more in the dictator game than those convicted for crimes that cannot be classified as either 
property or violent crime.4 In the Tobit model we also find a weakly significant difference between 
those convicted for property crime and for violent crime (Wald test, p = .0893), and in the Logit 
model a difference that is significant at conventional levels (p = .0042). Those convicted for violent 
crime are much less likely to give nothing in the dictator game. Yet these results do not replicate in 
                                                          
3 There is overlap between both categories for robbers. 
4 The residual category comprises drug crime, traffic violations, and the distribution of pornographic material. 
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the 2012 sample. Descriptively, we even find the opposite. Those convicted for violent crime give 
less, and are more likely to keep the entire endowment. 
 
 
2009 OLS Tobit0 Logit0 
property .102 
(.088) 
.131 
(.128) 
-.160 
(.680) 
violence .118+ 
(.102) 
.455* 
(.171) 
-2.703** 
(.779) 
cons .099 
(.111) 
-.249 
(.189) 
1.426+ 
(.849) 
N 58 58 58 
    
2012    
property -.034 
(.090) 
-.052 
(.139) 
.151 
(.599) 
violence -.087 
(.090) 
-.144 
(.138) 
.546 
(.601) 
cons .330*** 
(.085) 
.248+ 
(.131) 
-.851 
(.581) 
N 62 62 62 
 
Table 3 
Dictator Giving by Crime Class 
Logit0: dv is a dummy that is 1 if the participant has given nothing 
OLS: dv is fraction of pie, normalized on the interval [0,1] 
Tobit0: dv as in OLS, lower level 0 
standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1 
 
We therefore can only state 
 
Result 3: There is no clear difference in dictator choices between prisoners convicted for 
violent crime and for property crime. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the dictator game, prisoners give more than students, but less than other individuals of their age. 
Prisoners give more to charity than to another anonymous prisoner. It is not clear whether those 
convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.  
 
These findings are consistent with the wish to alleviate bad conscience. But one would need 
additional evidence, e.g. from self-reports of those who give substantially. Most students are never 
convicted. This does not suggest that selfishness causes crime. But one would again need additional 
evidence, e.g. from longitudinal data: are those scoring low in the dictator game less likely to be 
convicted over time, at least for property crime? Population comparisons are never more than one 
piece of the mosaic. But our data replicate that prisoners give substantially, and we show that they 
give even more if the recipient is a charity. 
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